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Loving Animals: Toward a New Animal
Advocacy by KATHY RUDY
U of Minnesota P, 2011 $19.95
Reviewed by ELANA SANTANA
Kathy Rudy’s Loving Animals argues
for a shift in the way humans relate to
animals that comes about through a focus
on affective relationships. Rudy divides her
book into different ways that humans use
animals: as pets, as food, in zoos, in
laboratories, and for clothing (although this
chapter uses clothing as a metaphor for
identity and perceptions of subjectivity).
Rudy suggests that a focus on particular
affective relationships between humans
and animals serves as a middle ground
between radical animal liberationists and
human-centred animal welfarists. Rudy’s
central claim initially seems to echo much
of what feminist animal studies and
feminist ethics of care theories have
argued. However, Rudy doesn’t reference
the work of scholars such as Carol Adams or
Josephine Donovan and overlooks the
important critiques they might offer on her
work. While claiming to “step outside that
Western way of thinking, into a territory
where we connect with animals at very
corporeal levels,” Rudy’s book consistently
falls in line with Western notions of human
exceptionalism and puts forth a reductive
and privileged approach to animal
advocacy. A book about the importance of
affect, particularity, and stories, in the work
of shifting human-animal relations is both
timely and crucial, yet Rudy misses this
opportunity by keeping the human/animal
binary in place throughout her book.
In her chapter about pets it is clear
that she has firsthand knowledge of living
with dogs and allowing for that experience
to guide her approach to troubling
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normative human/animal relations. It’s her
direct and particular experience living with
and loving dogs that makes this section the
most successful part of the book. In the
next chapter Rudy goes on to talk about the
horrors of factory farms and the merits of
small “ethical” farms.
Loving Animals would benefit from a
great deal more of what Rudy suggests
throughout the book: letting animal
subjects speak for themselves through
stories. Instead Rudy offers the reader her
own opinion—that some animals would
want to sacrifice themselves for human
benefit or that meat eating is okay only if
one is able to drive 50 miles to small farms
each week to pick up meat from farmers
who at least gave their animals a good life.
Rudy’s logic is flawed; she writes:
Eating the flesh of animals you’ve known
and loved, or paying farmers higher
prices to provide those animals with a
good life, can be seen as a good deal for
those animals. They would not have the
joy of living if they didn’t also make that
sacrifice. The horror of factory farming
moves farm animals indoors to
intolerable lives, lives not worth living;
but the movement toward veganism
banishes them from the earth
altogether.
Her discussion of animal sanctuaries in
chapter three stands in contrast to the idea
that veganism must lead to banishing farm
animals from the earth—why can’t these
animals thrive and experience joy in the
safety of animal sanctuaries as many of
them already do? Or why can’t we promote
more sustainable farms that provide
animals very happy lives in exchange for
their by-products? The idea that beings are
better off being raised and then killed at the
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hands of those who “loved” them, or
experimented on by a scientist who “cared”
for them, than to never have lived at all, is
questionable, and I would argue that this
betrayal is another version of the cruel fate
that Rudy rebukes in her discussion of
factory farms and lab animals.
In each of the stories Rudy tells
there is a clear moral dilemma on the part
of the pet owner, meat eater, or
vivisectionist that Rudy fails to explore with
depth. Instead, she defends their actions as
long as she believes they are making an
effort. I agree with Rudy that small changes
are often better than none at all. If you are
a pet owner, letting your particular love for
the animal you live with seep into your
relationships with other animals you may
never come in contact with is a good thing.
If you choose to eat meat it is of course
better to get it from small, local, and ethical
sources. And if your job involves
experimentation on an animal it would be
better if you confronted what it meant to
know and care for that animal so that you
might better understand all of the results of
your experiment. However, it is the baseline
of human exceptionalism from which
Rudy’s arguments spring that blocks her
ideas from contributing to radical shifts in
how humans treat animals. Rudy’s
insistence that she is not taking a radical
position on animals, or any other issues,
makes her focus on affect and corporeality
rather tenuous.
Rudy’s position on animals is not
only human-centred, it is privileged. She
writes, “Let’s tell the world that we believe
we owe animals a good life in return for
their sacrifice, and we will gladly pay
whatever the price to have meat that
comes from animals that, while alive, knew
joy, happiness, love, and peace.” Most
working-class people, particularly working
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class people of colour, do not have the
luxury of paying “whatever the price.” A
more inclusive and social justice-minded
alternative to Rudy’s proclamation is an
approach to animal advocacy that accounts
for varying levels of access to food and the
environmental justice issues around factory
farming. This could entail an animal
advocacy that begins by destabilizing the
human/animal binary and is sensitive to a
diversity of socio-economic circumstances;
for example, one that promotes local
farmer’s markets and community gardens
which best accommodate a vegetarian diet
where animal by-products may be
consumed but are from relatively happy
animals who do not have to “sacrifice” their
lives for the humans helping them to have
that happy life.
I firmly agree with Rudy when she
says that affect can “help us imagine better
ways of sharing the planet with animals,”
and that “affect is best displayed through
stories.” I also agree with the points at
which she sheds light on the complexity of
human relationships with animals and that
it is necessary to understand the context
and story of each human-animal
relationship before declaring what is best
for the human or animal involved. However,
I adamantly disagree that imagining that
“some animals may be willing to sacrifice
themselves for our benefit” is in any way
engaging empathically or attentively with
animals. This argument is presumptuous
and mandates a speaking for animals that
supports the privileged position of humans.
Much of her book reads as a
personal quest to absolve herself of human
guilt. Like white guilt, taking this position is
a regressive step for justice politics. I find it
helpful when thinking about animals to
place the category of species next to the
other constructed categories we navigate
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daily: race, gender, ability, class, sexuality.
Only when species is understood as
simultaneously a tool for identifying a real
material experience of being in the world
and as a constructed category of systemic
oppression can we begin to really shift our
relationships with animals. If we
understand species in this way, then
honouring, empathizing, and advocating for
the different beings we lump into one
group called animals is a much more
complex task than Rudy outlines in her
book. Often the only way to begin this
undertaking in our insidiously humancentred world is to insert a human minority
where we’ve written animals and then it is
easier to feel deeply how troubling reformbased justice politics can be.
Rudy’s book sets out towards a
great ideal: to engage in animal advocacy by
nurturing and highlighting our deep
connections with animals “in order to see
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the world from their eyes, in order for them
to become their own advocates through
relationships with us. To tell their stories
well we need to let them affect us.”
However, the body of her book tells a very
familiar story of human exceptionalism and
a dismissal of the thing animal advocacy so
desperately needs: an unapologetic, radical
approach to justice politics which uses
affect and stories to reveal the porosity of
the boundary between humans and
nonhumans.
ELANA SANTANA recently received her
Master’s in Environmental Studies in the
Faculty of Environmental Studies at York
University. She is currently working as a
teacher and urban farmer in New York City.
Her work explores the intersection of
lesbian feminism, posthumanism, and
environmental politics. She lives with and
loves a nonhuman named Olive.
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